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Abstract: 
I reflect on the preceding five contributions in this issue by focusing on the power 
dimensions of participation. I emphasize how power underlies and frames not only 
the activities and management of participatory development, but also our own 
personal/institutional involvement as development researchers and workers. I end 
with some thoughts on where these inescapable power dynamics leave our 
engagement with participatory development.  
 
Introduction 
“The power of participation” has two senses to it. The first points to the popularity of, 
and attraction to, the notion of participation. Thus, in development circles these 
days, it would be difficult to find many organizations that are not at least trying to 
integrate “beneficiary participation” into policy or programming. Even the World 
Bank, once the object of severe criticism regarding its relative neglect of civil society, 
has taken participatory development up with enthusiasm. But such appeal should 
perhaps give us pause. For, “participation as empowerment” can easily slide into 
“participation as power.” Here, it can be deployed to wield authority, helping to 
maintain and further elite or institutional hegemony. This is the second meaning of 
“the power of participation,” and I would like, in what follows, to tease out several of 
its dimensions. I will be greatly helped, in this endeavor, by the preceding analyses 
by Adely, Burde, Clemons & Vogt, Grant Lewis & Naidoo, and Makuwira. 
 
Consensus-Making 
Power is integral to consensus-making. In my article (2002), I underline that 
community consensus is an insufficient indicator of participation; much depends on 
how that consensus is achieved. Who institutes the rules of discussion and 
consensus-making? For what purpose? And what is the quality of the consensus 
reached? These are key questions for scrutinizing the power dynamics of 
participatory development. Thus, simply consulting people, adding up individual 
votes, or as Grant Lewis & Naidoo mention in the case of school governance in South 
Africa, fastidiously following election rules without regard for the establishment or 
quality of deliberation among participants, impoverishes the meaning and value of 
participatory decision making.  
 
Even with appropriate discussion rules and lively debate, there can be “micro power” 
processes at play. Rhetorical devices - sensationalist arguments, technical or 
esoteric language, misrepresentation of evidence, loud or aggressive speech - can 
all unduly sway opinion or silence and intimidate participants. While often subtle, 
these devices may also be intentional, as when government or NGO officials bring in 
scientific “experts” to speak to (read: persuade) community members about, say, 
the viability of a hydroelectric dam.  
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Consequently, reaching consensus is compromised when the quality of deliberation is 
itself compromised by power inequalities. But it is important not to take for granted 
the very condition of having to achieve a consensus. The concern here is not just 
that consensus-making may be coerced, but also that the consensus must be single. 
As the case studies by Adely, Burde, Clemons & Vogt, and Grant Lewis & Naidoo all 
reveal, the demand for a single policy direction or decision risks stifling social 
plurality. It sets up an all-or-nothing equation in which some community members 
win and others--usually minorities or the disadvantaged--lose. It assumes a 
monolithic community, prescribing one formula for all women, classes or 
racialized/ethnicized groups, irrespective of differences, inequalities and tensions 
between and among these groups. In post-conflict situations, Burde shows how this 
problem may be even more serious, “aggravat[ing] rather than assuag[ing] the 
social divisions that are particularly dangerous and pronounced.” 
 
In all the above instances of power-induced consensus-making, the political result 
may well be that elites win. Indeed, it is precisely the latter’s socioeconomic, cultural 
and patriarchical power that allows them to coerce decisions or force a single 
consensus, so that the less privileged end up being “asked to put aside their ... goals 
for the sake of the common good” (Grant Lewis & Naidoo) and poor people are 
effectively “excluded from the decision-making process” (Makuwira; cf. Burde). Thus, 
despite the trappings of empowerment, participatory processes can end up 
reproducing or even advancing elite domination.  
 
Managerialism 
“Managerialism” in this context refers to the process by which participatory 
development is subjected to technocratic and institutional demands. For example, 
Makuwira writes about participatory basic education in Malawi, not as empowering 
for communities, but as a “tool for achieving better [i.e., more efficient] project 
outcomes.” Participation is thus molded to fit bureaucratic or organizational needs: 
people can meet, but decisions have to be taken quickly to obey budgetary or 
reporting deadlines; community input is good, but quantitative information (e.g., 
counting votes) is privileged over qualitative information (e.g., women’s narratives); 
or, as Clemons and Vogt state, participation takes place, but it is supported by 
insufficient technical and financial capacity, or is even used instrumentally to 
“legitimize the implementing agency as ‘grassroots oriented’.” In this scheme of 
things, participation is “managed” (Adely; Grant Lewis & Naidoo) and 
“institutionalized” (in the same way that mental patients are said to be); it becomes 
“tokenistic,” with the alleged beneficiaries treated “largely [as] objects rather than 
subjects” (Makuwira). 
 
But managerialism can be more than just bureaucratization. Indeed, if institutions 
merely pay lip-service to beneficiary involvement, if they hijack participation for 
organizational needs, then what really matters is not whether or not participation 
works, but whether it helps improve and advance the organization (cf. Ferguson, 
1990). Under the managerialist cloak, then, participation stands far from community 
empowerment, wherein facilitating organizations are meant to work themselves out 
of a job; it stands, rather, for the aggrandizement of institutional authority. Such a 
stance is particularly ominous in the context of foreign “aid”: for, participation can be 
deployed to become yet another western conditionality, a further means to make 
demands, or perhaps even exact penalties, on communities in the Third World. 
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Panopticism 
Faced with these decidedly negative dimensions of participation, it is not surprising, 
as Adely points out, that some communities have resisted being part of participatory 
development projects. But what if, with enough persistence on the part of the 
“facilitating” organization, such resistance eventually gives way to acquiescence, 
conscious or unconscious? This indeed is the import of Foucault’s notion of  
“panopticism” (1984, p. 239), whereby the surveillance of people in modern societies 
(for example, in the form of TV monitoring, the creation of social security “dossiers,” 
or more recently, “security assessments”) is so pervasive that people, even those 
who do not like it, end up internalizing it.  
 
The inherently public character of participation makes such panopticism more than a 
possibility. Makuwira speaks of the “supervision” of community schools by a host of 
officials - village leaders, village committees, District Education Officers, NGOs, 
teachers; and Adely and Burde quote evidence of project beneficiaries feeling 
obliged, under the scrutiny of government officials and neighbors, to give only the 
“official story.” Rather than fostering information exchange and free debate, then, 
participation in this case stifles, censors, disciplines or silences participants, 
particularly those who are already disadvantaged.  
 
While communities may initially dislike or be suspicious of participatory development, 
it is not inconceivable that, gradually, they develop an “interest” in participation: 
NGO or government officials may find it helps “monitor” the community; 
husbands/fathers may use it to keep a tab on their wives/children; elites may see in 
it an opportunity for keeping dissent in check; and everyone may enjoy it for its 
production of gossip and rumor about friends and neighbors. Eventually, to follow 
Foucault’s logic, each community member could end up self-disciplining, that is, 
internalizing the political, social, cultural and patriarchical dos and don’ts. 
 
Panopticism gives a bizarrely menacing twist to the practice of “participatory 
monitoring and evaluation” (mentioned by Makuwira). Intended for the community 
to assess its own participatory efforts, the practice would translate, under a panoptic 
lens, into a community “monitoring itself monitor”! Although of course extreme, this 
surveillance of surveillance places participatory development squarely in the camp of 
1984.  
 
Self-Implication 
But what about our own participation in participation (as academics, researchers, or 
development workers)? Given the imbrication of elite and institutional interests with 
participatory development, what is our own “interest” in it? As Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak (1988) argues, we are all inevitably part of institutions (academic, 
development-related) that have their own class, geopolitical and organizational 
demands; so when we carry out research or do field work on participation, we cannot 
pretend to have “pure” or “objective” motivations (Kapoor, 2004).  
 
There is an unmistakable self-righteousness and benevolence that is part of the 
culture of development, at least in part due to the pervasive notion that “we” are 
helping “them.” As Adely intimates, such self-congratulation may well be more 
pronounced when it comes to participatory development, given the “progressive” 
connotation imputed to “empowerment.” Yet, the bureaucratic imperatives described 
earlier, as well as such constraints as research grant deadlines, the need to receive 
high grades, pleasing thesis committees, defending one’s research/organizational 
“turf,” and tenure/ promotion pressures to publish or perish - all these tarnish 
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development “assistance” and the pursuit of knowledge. It is problematic, then, to 
flash participatory development as a badge or romanticize our involvement in it. 
Innocently or benevolently claiming that one is helping a Third World community 
become participatory, for example, is not only self-aggrandizing but also risks 
perpetuating elite, panoptic or institutional power, all at the expense of the 
disadvantaged. (I cannot help but draw parallels here with the current U.S. and 
British governments' triumphalist claims of “bringing freedom” to Iraq.) 
 
One of the ultimate ironies of participatory development is that we may well be 
asking more of Third World communities than we ask of ourselves. Molenaers and 
Renard (2003) report, for instance, that World Bank poverty reduction schemes in 
Bolivia not only make civil society involvement a condition of aid, but also have such 
high expectations of participation as to be unrealistic . Yet, how many of our own 
poverty reduction programmes in the West, or indeed political, social, educational or 
work institutions, are participatory in the way that we desire participatory 
development to be? Very few, if any, I imagine.  
 
I am not arguing that participation programs in Third World communities should be 
held to any lower a standard than in the West (or Southern metropolitan centers). 
But when public participation over “there” becomes a conditionality or is unduly 
ambitious relative to “here,” then it is suspiciously disciplinary. When we have such 
high expectations of the marginalized Third World “other,” we are probably doing one 
or all of the following: (i) trying to control and “manage” disadvantaged communities 
(in ways that have already been discussed above); (ii) projecting and compensating 
for our own inadequacies (e.g., lack of meaningful citizen participation in liberal 
democracies); and (iii) using the Third World as our laboratory, that is, 
experimenting on marginalized communities for our own edification and perfectibility. 
In all such cases, participation is once again but a ploy, a decidedly powerful 
instrument.   
 
I thus whole-heartedly identify with Adely’s students in their “soul searching” vis-à-
vis the dilemmas of participatory development. I would add, though, that it is 
important not just that we soul search about participation “over there,” but that we 
reverse the anthropological gaze to also ask about our own (personal, 
historical/colonial, geopolitical, gendered, socioeconomic, cultural, institutional) 
implications and stakes in participation. 
 
Conclusion: What to do? 
 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, 
which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we 
always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a 
hyper- and pessimistic activism.” (Foucault, 1984, p. 343) 
 
Indeed, my point in teasing out some of the many power (and often highly negative) 
dimensions of participatory development is not to say that it is evil, but that it is 
dangerous. The idea is not to “write off” participation, as some of Adely’s students 
suspect critics of participatory development have done, but to develop a healthy 
skepticism about it, or as Burde characterizes it, “to note that it is a complex tool 
that can be manipulated in multiple ways.” Developing an interest in, perhaps even a 
good deal of political commitment to, participation (viz. “participation as 
empowerment”) is important; but it is equally significant to be aware that these may 
be vested and interested (viz. “participation as power”).      
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On the one hand, this awareness means developing a scrupulous vigilance to the 
power of participation in its many, changing forms (personal, institutional, etc., as 
well as old and new). But on the other, once identified, the idea in my view is not to 
try and eliminate power (I don’t think one can), but to try and minimize its 
oppressive and unequal effects by opening it up for collective and democratic 
contestation and debate. This may be a monumental and tension-filled task, 
especially given such obstinate problems as class and gender inequalities; but such 
are the challenges of participatory development. They mean that “we always have 
something to do.” 
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